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Abstract 
This paper uses a computable general equilibrium model consistent with stylized facts 
about Cameroon to assess the impact of the 1994 regional fiscal reform. Two main 
elements characterize this model: it accounts for the asymmetric impact with trading 
partners and the dualism on product and factor markets through due consideration of 
both formal and informal sector's activities. Price formation in the model is standard, 
except that import prices are adjusted to take into account tax evasion and smuggling. 
Our analysis focuses on the macroeconomic impact and the welfare implications of the 
simulations. Overall, the various simulations lead to higher economic growth and 
expansion in employment. However, depending on the combination of taxes used, the 
sectoral effects are different. As a member of the CFA zone Cameroon can achieve a real 
depreciation on an individual basis through stringent fiscal and monetary policies or 
through a uniform tariff-cum-subsidy (UTCS) scheme, which is obtained via subsidies 
to selected export crops and high import tariffs. The simulation of this policy scenario 
leads to an increase in GDP at factor cost, while employment increases at a higher rate 
than in other scenarios; hence the unemployment rate falls and households' welfare 
increases. All households are better off in this simulation, although in the formal household 
category, welfare increased by a lesser amount. 
1. Introduction 
All countries of the Communaute Financiere en Afrique (CFA) have experienced negative 
external shocks (terms of trade, interest rates, effect of worldwide recession) since the 
1970s. A deficient national policy environment and a weak industrial base increased the 
negative effects of these shocks and this in turn led to a loss of competitiveness of the 
domestic economy, manifested by deteriorating balance of payments, slow growth and 
unemployment. In such conditions, appropriate combinations of micro , meso and 
macroeconomic policies are needed to return to competitive equilibrium. The required 
policy packages were formulated in the structural adjustment programmes (SAPs). SAPs 
aimed to restore macroeconomic balance, to integrate the economy into the global 
economy, to greatly increase the role of (relatively undistorted) markets in allocating 
resources and to create the institutions needed for those purposes (Corbo and Fisher, 
1993). 
The structural adjustment policy mix includes stabilization (demand) and adjustment 
(supply) components. The objective of the stabilization component is to reduce aggregate 
demand to levels compatible with those of output and sustainable debt. Th is is achieved 
by adequate fiscal and monetary policies. The supply side of the SAP a ims at reducing 
distortions to efficient production, which is obtained by liberalizing trade regimes, keeping 
the exchange rate close to equilibrium, moving away from price controls, reforming the 
public sector, restructuring the financial sector and reducing the rigidities in prices 
including wages. At the end of the process, it is expected that the economy's production 
and consumption would change in favour of fewer imports and more exports and domestic 
production. 
Because of the specific characteristics of the monetary setup of CFA countries, SAP 
recommendations on the supply side included all but exchange rate policy. Results were 
not spectacular and pressure increased for including exchange rate policy in the package. 
On 12 January 1994, and after a long period of speculation, the CFA f r anc was devalued 
for the first time since 1948. The devaluation was reinforced by the adoption of a new 
fiscal code by the Central African Customs and Economic Union (UDEAC) within a 
Regional Fiscal Reform Programme (RFRP). The new fiscal code was expected to create 
a neutral and flexible trade and fiscal incentive system. 
The principal objective of this research was to assess the impact of this reform package. 
A major focus is on the fiscal reform, which is assessed using a computable general 
equilibrium (CGE) model. The use of CGE modelling for assessing trade policy options 
is motivated by three considerations. First is the realization that prices matter, as they 
adjust with quantities to clear product and factor markets, with the speed of the adjustment 
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depending on prevailing constraints. The second consideration is that interaction between 
markets and sectors also matters. Finally, the economic structures are important; the 
relative shares of sectors as well as the power of social groups are useful in understanding 
policy on both efficiency and sustainability grounds. CGE is particularly useful here as 
partial equilibrium analysis can take into account neither direct and indirect policy effects 
nor specific structural features of the economy under investigation. 
Our principal objective is reached via three specific objectives. The first objective is 
to provide a synthesis of trade and exchange rate policy options under fixed and flexible 
exchange rates with reference to CFA member states. The second specific objective is to 
construct a social accounting matrix (SAM) and a CGE for Cameroon that are conducive 
to the analysis of trade policy based on data portraying the prevailing structure of the 
Cameroon economy. The final objective is to simulate alternative trade policy options in 
order to investigate their impact on growth performance. 
The rest of the paper unfolds as follows. In section two we present the trade and 
exchange rate policy options in Cameroon and other CFA countries; section three provides 
a description of the SAM used for the calibration of the model, which is specified in 
section four. Section five presents the simulation experiments and section six concludes 
with the ensuing policy recommendations. 
2. Trade policy options in Cameroon and other 
CFA countries 
In Cameroon and other countries in the CFA Zone (CFAZ) the trade regime in the pre-
reform period (middle to late 1980s) included a restrictive tariff, a non-tariff protection 
scheme and widespread price controls on most manufactured products. On top of these 
there was a marketing board for the main agricultural export crops (coffee, cocoa). These 
measures were, as well, part of an overall discretionary scheme for tax exemptions on 
most products within the investment or tax codes. This trade regime in general led to an 
important bias against exports. The implicit tax on Cameroonian export sectors resulting 
from tariff protection has been estimated at 27% in the short run and a loss in output 
evaluated at 3.3% of the 1988 GDP (Njinkeu, 1996). 
In such a distorted environment trade policy can be appropriately evaluated only 
when it includes commercial policy, exchange rate policy and marketing issues. Trade 
policy is viewed as including all measures whose impact can change the incentives for 
producing or consuming either tradeable goods versus non-tradeable or some tradeable 
goods relative to others. We concentrate on exchange rate and trade policies. 
Exchange rate policy options 
Despite the now accepted need for appropriate exchange rates for international 
competitiveness, devaluation leads to hot controversies. Devaluation has a contractionary 
effect on the overall economy, and the reliance on real exchange rate targeting to protect 
external competitiveness leads to inflation, which is costly. Furthermore, maintaining a 
fixed exchange rate can lead to a policy credibility issue. We address each of these issues 
with specific reference to CFAZ and particularly to Cameroon. We use data on recent 
developments in the zone to illustrate. 
Impact of currency devaluation 
The theoretical impacts of devaluation in an economy with a fixed exchange rate regime 
are well known. In the short run a devaluation of the currency will lower the real exchange 
rate and can have an expansionary effect on the demand for non-tradeable goods and the 
production of tradeable goods. This result, however, depends on whether there is full 
capacity utilization or not, and on the relative importance of the tradeable relative to the 
non-tradeable. In the presence of underutilized capacity, currency devaluation is 
4 RESEARCH PAPER 9 6 
expansionary. When we allow for tradeables and non-tradeables, devaluation has no 
effect on output as there will be resource shifts from the production of non-tradeables to 
that of tradeables without a change in the aggregate level of output or employment. 
When the level of the exchange rate is determined by its fundamentals, devaluation is 
not necessarily contractionary in the long run. However, in the short run, there are effects 
arising from demand and/or supply sides, and the relative sizes of traded versus non-
traded goods sectors. For traded goods, a currency devaluation stimulates production, 
unless production costs rise in the same proportions. The situation is less clear on the 
non-traded goods sectors as the effect depends on the relative weights of private 
consumption, private investment and government expenditure. Overall, exportable sectors 
expand, while importable sectors shrink. The net effect on the non-tradeables and the 
overall output is ambiguous. 
The effect on investment is ambiguous as well. A devaluation as a component of a 
liberalization programme renders capital goods expensive in some sectors and relatively 
cheaper (or at least available) for others. This change in the relative price of capital to 
firms causes shifts within and between sectors without prior knowledge of the net effect. 
Private consumption and investment will most likely rise due to reduced household 
income, an income redistribution in favour of households with low marginal propensities 
to spend, high interest rates induced by currency devaluation, and the rise in the price of 
imported capital and intermediate goods. The effect on government expenditure is 
contractionary when the government is a net external debtor. Moreover, these effects 
may be weakened or reversed depending on whether the private sector is a net international 
creditor and whether the private sector's domestic assets are indexed to the price level; or 
it could depend on private agents' anticipation of devaluation and its likely effect on 
interest rates. The substitution effect of devaluation or the induced shift in domestic 
demand from traded to non-traded goods is also important. 
On the supply side, domestic production cost usually increases in both sectors as a 
result of currency devaluation. If wage increases are not substantial, production of traded 
goods is stimulated. The impact on the non-traded goods sectors is uncertain. Specific 
conditions may also weaken or reverse these conclusions. If overall the traded goods 
sectors experience an expansion, the short-run impact on the non-traded goods sectors 
depends on specific conditions. Nothing is clear for either subgroup of these sectors 
(tradeable and non-tradeable) and a disaggregation of these categories is necessary to 
trace the welfare impacts on the socioeconomic categories. 
A related issue is that of real exchange rate targeting. Exchange rate policy concerns 
the real exchange rate, which reflects the relative competitiveness of the domestic vis-a-
vis (he foreign economy. It defines the ratio of foreign prices in domestic currency units 
relative to the domestic price. Under a fixed exchange rate regime, if the real exchange 
rate is low, domestic goods are too expensive compared with foreign produced goods 
and sales of domestically produced goods shrink, leading to unemployment. To return to 
competitive levels, the exchange rate must be devalued via a nominal devaluation, or by 
allowing some flexibility in domestic prices, of which wages play a key role. If there are 
rigidities in domestic prices, and devaluation is excluded, adjustment becomes very 
difficult. 
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In the case of currency over-valuation in CFA countries, a country can achieve a real 
depreciation on individual basis through stringent fiscal and monetary policy and in so 
doing, achieve a nominal deflation in the domestic price level or less deflation relative to 
its trading partners. A real devaluation can also be achieved through a uniform tariff-
cum-subsidy (UTCS) scheme, also called mock devaluation, which is obtained via 
subsidies to selected export crops and high import tariffs. A third option is the reduction 
of domestic costs by lowering prices of selected non-tradeable inputs such as water or 
electricity, or lowering wages or allowing a more flexible labour market. The wage 
structure, despite a recent reform of the labour code, is quite rigid in Cameroon. Trade 
liberalization alone in such circumstances will not lead to the required adjustment. 
To decide the needed rate of devaluation, it is necessary to determine the extent to 
which the currency is over-valued. One option is the purchasing power parity (PPP) 
based exchange rate, using as the base a year during which the level of imbalance in the 
trade or fiscal deficit was at a sustainable level. The recommended rate of devaluation is 
given by the inflation differential between the country and its trading partners. PPP 
calculations raise theoretical and empirical problems analysed by Devarajan et al. (1993). 
An alternative to the PPP approach is to rely on the Salter-Swan dependent economy 
model modified by allowing imperfect substitution via the Armington (1969) assumption 
and using the price indexes of tradeables and non-tradeables. The CGE framework 
presented in section three meets that requirement. 
Exchange rate options 
Maintaining a fixed exchange rate can lead to policy credibility issues, unless 
accompanying instruments are available. Strict financial discipline is required for 
maintaining a fixed exchange rate regime. Otherwise, several devaluations of the currency 
will be required and this could increase the uncertainty on the llow of goods and factors 
of production. Constraints imposed by a fixed exchange rate include: (1) equality of 
domestic and world inflation appropriately adjusted for currency depreciation; (2) equality 
of the rate of real output and the rate of growth of money net of the rate of world inflation; 
(3) maintenance of growth of credit below or near the rate of growth of nominal income. 
Fixed exchange rate regime is a credible policy under specific conditions; that is, it 
depends upon the consolidated account of the financial and nonfinancial public sectors. 
Solvency of this consolidated account is obtained and financial discipline guaranteed 
when the present value of anticipated future primary surplus is at least equal to the face 
value of the public sector's debt net of seignorage revenue. A fixed exchange rate limits 
seignorage revenue and consequently the resources available to the public sector. 
Substantial reserves are hence required. Financial discipline can be maintained with a 
fixed exchange rate regime if the monetary authorities can use currency devaluation to 
reduce or eliminate debts that are denominated in domestic currency. Seignorage revenues 
and inflation have been negligible in the CFAZ as compared to other countries, but real 
interest rates are higher for the CFA countries. 
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Whether the exchange rate should be permanently fixed or changed frequently also 
depends on the issue of time consistency. For the policy to be time consistent, periodic 
adjustments are preferable, as the authorities can use the exchange rate to orient the 
inflation rate to socially desirable objectives. This requires that private agents either do 
not anticipate currency devaluation or that they are convinced the government is committed 
to price stability and will not devalue several times. 
Whether a permanent peg, such as the CFA arrangement, is sustainable therefore 
depends on the cost to a country of abiding by the rule. If the cost to a country that opts 
to leave the agreements and manage its own exchange rate policy is too high, partners 
will never take this option—the consequence being, sometimes, heavy social costs in 
case of external shocks. One alternative is to adopt rigid exchange rate rules for 
devaluation. These rules consist of either linking the decision with specific external shocks, 
or giving more autonomy in the management of the central bank to central bankers 
committed to price stability (see Aghevli and Montiel, 1991), which is comparable to a 
crawling peg regime (Neary 1991). 
Several authors have studied the choice of exchange rate regime and of the adjustment 
tools.1 Devarajan and de Melo (1987) and Devarajan et al. (1990) looked into this issue 
for the CFAZ. For the 1970s, the member countries could use tariff protection, domestic 
taxes and government expenditures to obtain the necessary depreciation in the real 
exchange rate. This was not possible for the 1980s and the early 1990s, however, when 
the same institutional arrangement could not provide the necessary depreciation of the 
real exchange rate. 
A permanent peg is sustainable in the long run if wage policy is consistent with 
continued profitability in the traded goods sector, which in turn depends on the inflation 
profile. To ensure inflation discipline, the monetary and fiscal policy frameworks must 
be considered jointly. When correctly implemented, the equilibrium discretionary solution 
for inflation will be the same in an adjustable peg regime as in the flexible rate case. 
Insulation is another desirable characteristic of the exchange rate regime. It measures the 
capacity of the policy regime to adequately react to shocks, external or domestic. The 
extent of factor price flexibility (especially wage) is important in this case. When wages 
are perfectly flexible, the two regimes are equivalent irrespective of the origin of the 
disturbance. In case of imperfect wage flexibility the origin (domestic or foreign) is 
important and a fixed exchange rate is more stabilizing than an adjustable peg. The 
contrary is true for the adjustable peg and in the case of supply shocks. Concerning 
shocks originating on the international market, if wages are not flexible, no definite 
conclusion can be drawn. 
A natural question then concerns the relative cost and benefit of fixed and flexible 
regimes. The evaluation of the pros and cons of the flexible versus fixed exchange rate 
regime is related to the trade-off between inflation and growth.2 Exchange rate can be 
looked at from either the real target or the nominal anchor. In the real target approach, 
the exchange rate is an indispensable tool for achieving domestic and external balance. 
Exchange rate policy is therefore used very often, sometimes on a discretionary basis, to 
fine-tune the economy. An appropriate combination of expenditure-switching policies 
(trade and exchange rate policies) and expenditure-reducing policies (fiscal and monetary 
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policies) is called for. In the nominal anchor approach, frequent use of exchange rate 
policy is not stabilizing. The inflationary cost of modifying the exchange rate is far 
greater than the benefits. Especially when we take price expectations into account, a 
fixed compared with a flexible exchange rate regime is more beneficial. 
The adoption of a fixed exchange rate is acceptable under four conditions. First, the 
economy is small enough that its membership in the currency union is compatible with 
optimum currency area requirements. Second, the currency is pegged to a currency or 
basket of currencies covering at least 50% of foreign trade. Third, the economy can 
sustain an inflation rate consistent with the currency to which the peg is made. Fourth, 
the country is willing to accept the constraints imposed by the arrangement. An analysis 
of trade orientation and other selected economic indicators for the CFAZ suggests that 
these four conditions are not met. Analysis of foreign trade data revealed that France is 
the principal partner, followed by Holland or the USA depending on the level of bilateral 
exchange rates. Performances differ on the import and export sides. The share of imports 
from France has always been greater than 40%, but substantial variations exist for exports. 
Overall, total trade with France has fluctuated with a downward trend. Management of 
trade and exchange rate policies should pay special and differentiated attention to the 
export and import sides. The differentiated trend of exchange rate on the import and 
export sides suggests that commodity composition is important. 
Trade policy options 
Like most developing countries, members of the CFAZ put in place during (he early 
years of their independence a strategy of global economic development characterized by 
protectionism including important tariff barriers and quantitative restrictions (QRs) on 
imports. Since January 1994, the tariff protection is legislated in Cameroon by a more 
liberalized fiscal code—the UDEAC's regional fiscal reform programme (RFRP).3 On 
the import and export side, the programme distinguishes goods according to their origin 
and destination within or outside the region. Unlike the former tax system with its four 
main taxes, the new system has only two main groups of taxes. The first element is the 
common external tariff (CET), comprising customs duty and temporary surcharge taxes 
(excise and progressive taxes). The second is the turnover tax (TCA) whose base is the 
sum of the cost, insurance and freight (cif) value, the customs duty, and the temporary 
surcharge tax value where applicable. 
In the customs duties, code products are classified in either of four groups, representing 
successive levels of product transformation. Group I products include necessary goods 
and have the lowest rate. Group II includes primary and equipment products. Group III 
products include semi-finished goods and group IV comprises consumption goods. The 
tax rates per category are 5%, 10%, 20% and 30%, respectively. A temporary surcharge 
tax was put in place to substitute for the protection formerly provided to firms via non-
tariff barriers (NTBs). It is thus temporary and its rate varies according to products but 
may not exceed 30%. All QRs were mandated by the reform to be abolished in all UDEAC 
member states by 30 June 1996 and the rate for the temporary tax was to reach zero by 
1999. 
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Sales on local markets are subjected to indirect taxes made of two components: (1) an 
excise tax and (2) a turnover tax. Each of these taxes has budgetary considerations. For 
locally produced goods and services the tax base is either the ex factory price or the 
market price, net of other taxes. The turnover tax has two rates; a normal rate and a 
reduced rate, with the latter being applicable for essential products. The turnover tax is 
comparable to a value added tax. Medicines, books, medical and surgical equipment, 
and manufacturing equipment are exempted from the TCA, and the tax paid on raw 
materials is deductible when the finished products is sold. The rates are freely fixed by 
each member state within the range of 3% to 6% for the reduced rate, and 7% to 18% for 
the normal rate. In July 1994, the rates fixed in Cameroon were 5% and 15%. In July 
1996, these rates went, respectively, to 7% and 18%; the excise as well as temporary 
taxes on imports and exports are still not applicable. 
The impact of the change of the turnover tax rates, which now constitute the main tax 
base in Cameroon, is analysed with the CGE model presented in the next section. Our 
major concerns are the impact on growth. We are also interested in the specific effects on 
sectoral output, employment, trade and fiscal balance, and the distributional costs of the 
fiscal policy adjustment. The construction of an appropriate SAM is a prerequisite to the 
modelling process. 
3. Description of the SAM 
The quality of the results deriving from the CGE model depends on the data used as 
summarized in the social accounting matrix (SAM). A SAM gives a snapshot of the 
economy at one point in time (base year). In our case, the base year is 1989/90, chosen 
because it precedes the 1990 liberalization in Cameroon and is more representative of 
economic conditions at the time of the reform. It was also the most recent year for which 
such work could be done. The input-output was completed in 1993 by the Ministry of 
Planning, and was used to construct the generic SAM reported in Njinkeu et al. (1994). 
Our SAM has a total of 73 accounts divided into 9 blocks (factors, institutions, sectors, 
products, local market, import market, composite good, export market and investment-
savings). There are two factors of production (capital and labour) subdivided into formal 
and informal sectors. There are four groups of market participants or institutions 
(households, firms, the government and foreign partners). Households are distinguished 
according to the place of residence and the sector of occupation. This classification is 
made so as to consider a poverty profile that allows welfare assessment and is consistent 
with stylized facts about Cameroon, including the distinction between urban and rural, 
formal and informal, and employed and unemployed.4 We therefore obtain four household 
categories (informal rural households [IRHJ, informal urban households [IUH], formal 
households [FH], and unemployed households [UH]). Because of lack of social security, 
unemployed households' revenues are made up of transfers from other household 
categories. Foreign partners are distinguished according to the exchange rate regime: 
CFAF zone (CFAZ), Nigeria (NIG) and the rest of the world (ROW). 
Imported goods are imperfect substitutes for similar tradeable goods produced 
domestically. Such composite goods are used for intermediate consumption, final 
consumption or both. Domestic sales of an exportable and sales on each of the three 
markets are also Armington aggregates. A step-by-step aggregation is made, as described 
above. A household consumes an aggregate bundle of goods originating from either of 
four sources (Cameroon, the CFAZ, Nigeria or ROW). We consider one representative 
firm and one government. 
Eleven sectors are considered, of which four are in agriculture: formal food agriculture 
(FFA), informal food agriculture (IFA), formal rent agriculture (FRA), and informal rent 
agriculture (IRA). Three are in industry: export-oriented industry (EIND), other industries 
in the formal sector (FAIN) and the informal industrial sector (IAIN)). We have one oil 
sector (OILS) and three service sectors: public service (NTSS), formal service sector 
(FTS), and informal service sector (ITS). These 11 sectors supply the market with 7 
products, which are sold on either domestic or foreign markets. Domestic consumers 
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choose from a basket made of non-tradeables or a composite of imports and domestic 
substitutes of each tradeable. Savings-investment balance is given in an "accumulation 
account". 
Households' incomes are obtained from factor (labour, capital) remuneration, dividends 
and transfers from the government. Total dividend is distributed among households and 
is paid by firms only on formal sector capital. Firms' revenues are made of capital 
remuneration and transfer received from the government. Because of the deficient social 
security system, the unemployed get their revenues from households. We assume formal 
households pay an income tax while informal households and the unemployed pay a 
lump-sum tax. 
Adjustment policies with poverty concerns are designed in such a way that poorer 
segments of the population stand a higher probability of resisting external shocks. This 
is obtained by either direct transfer or putting in place institutions that are conducive to 
their greater participation in market transactions. Targeting aims at making transfers to 
the poor so that their income level after the transfer is above the stated poverty line. Our 
approach is to assess whether the immediate impact on the household category that 
includes a higher share of the poor has its welfare improved. 
Policy with poverty alleviation concerns can focus on perfect targeting of the poor 
when this is possible, not only subsidizing the poor for the losses that ensue from the 
policy but compensating them in such a manner that their total income rises above the 
poverty line. An alternative to this is a universalistic targeting by which all households 
are subsidized to the extent that none remains below the poverty line. It is evident that 
such an approach requires a larger budget and the amount may be prohibitive, in addition 
to the possibility of increasing an inequitable income distribution. An appealing approach 
is to associate each policy option with its likely impact on economic welfare differentiated 
by socioeconomic categories. We follow such an approach, and we do so by considering 
the implied social safety net of our model. This relies on exogenous transfers among the 
institutions considered in our SAM: the four household categories, the unemployed, the 
representative firm, the government and the foreign agent.5 
4. CGE model specification 
Modelling Cameroonian trade options integrates the following elements: (1) asymmetric 
impact with trading partners; (2) a particular attention devoted to cross-border trade with 
Nigeria, with possible impact on the economic structures; and (3) the dualism of product 
and factor markets through due consideration of both formal and informal sector activities. 
These elements are important to capture the salient characteristics of the Cameroon 
economy: first it is a small open economy in which firms produce for sale on local and 
foreign markets, and households choose between locally produced and imported goods. 
Moreover, Cameroon has a dualistic production structure wherein a traditional (informal) 
sector with rather weak infrastructure and a modern (formal) sector coexist. This carries 
over to the labour market, which is segmented, with high unemployment and a shortage 
of skilled workers. Social welfare standards are also low, and the wealth distribution is 
highly skewed. Finally, pricing practices differ according to the sector of production or 
the foreign markets.6 
Analytical famework of the modelling approach 
The analysis of trade policy options is done with a standard Salter-Swan dependent 
economy model in which the tradeable sector is divided into importables and exportables, 
with associated welfare indicators appearing to be minimal requirements. Adjustment 
policies aim to reduce the level of aggregate demand, switch consumption away from 
foreign produced goods and production toward tradeable goods, and expand supply. The 
Salter-Swan dependent economy framework is a good benchmark, since it distinguishes 
the tradeable and non-tradeable sectors of the economy. If the analytical framework is 
limited to the tradeable sectors, such as the Balassa-Corden effective protection analytical 
framework, the effects of currency devaluation cannot be considered. Likewise, a model 
based on non-tradeables only is not useful since in such an economy terms of trade 
shocks are not an issue. 
For that matter, standard international trade theory suffers from a major deficiency. 
The small open economy assumption requires that the country be a price taker on the 
international market, leading to perfect substitution between an importable and a 
domestically produced tradeable good; the price of non-tradeable goods is also assumed 
to be determined entirely by conditions prevailing in domestic markets. The framework 
also assumes constant returns to scale that lead to complete specialization and that rule 
out two-way trade. Likewise, the assumption of no substitution between domestic goods 
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and imports—as in a two-gap model—makes foreign trade policy useless. Tradeable 
and non-tradeable sectors have to be taken into account and importable and exportable 
sectors distinguished, so that import tariffs, export subsidy and taxation schemes can be 
considered. This is accomplished via the Armington assumption, which introduces a 
composite good at the production and consumption levels. 
The Armington assumption is an improvement over two alternatives in the literature. 
The first is the trade theory framework in which distinction is made between traded 
goods that are perfectly substitutable for imports and non-traded goods whose prices are 
entirely determined by local conditions. The additional constant returns to scale 
assumption leads to extreme specialization in production; this pattern of specialization is 
rarely (if ever) observed. 
The second alternative framework, arising from structuralist analysis, assumes zero 
substitution between domestic and imported goods. This framework leads to the 
conclusion that trade policy can be useful in closing the foreign exchange gap, as suggested 
by a two-gap type model. The Armington assumption allows us to make up a composite 
good and to allow for two-way trade at sectoral levels, as well as price differentiation 
between domestic and foreign produced goods. 
Policy directed toward one sector affects others, and under the prevalent constraints 
(economic, institutional) of developing economies, the adjustment process may be slow. 
The role of the key players and the adjustment process may be handled by either the 
choice of adequate functional forms used to model consumers' and producers' optimizing 
behaviour, or the closure rule adopted,7'8 or both. 
The basic structure of the model 
The model is presented in five blocks (production, income and savings, demand, price, 
and equilibrium). In the production block, the production process is a two-step nested 
structure. At the top level, primary inputs (labour and capital) are combined with a Cobb-
Douglas technology to make up value added; this is combined within a fixed coefficient 
Leontief technology with intermediate inputs at the second level to give the output. 
Households receive the larger part of salaries, while a small part is paid to the CFAZ 
countries as salaries for foreign workers.9 The capital remuneration is distributed among 
local agents (households, companies and government) who are owners of the capital 
invested in the production activities. These agents save after paying taxes, consuming 
and making transfers. The sum of savings is used to finance global investment. Because 
of the lack of institutions, the unemployed are considered only as consumers and supported 
by local workers. 
In the demand block, quantity of imports, exports, supply and local demand are 
Armington aggregates. These quantities may be considered from either a technological 
or a behavioural point of view. An Armington aggregation of sales on domestic and 
foreign markets makes up the total supply of each good. A similar relationship for the 
constant elasticity of substitution (CES) aggregation of domestically and foreign produced 
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goods holds on the demand side. We assume consumers do not distinguish goods according 
to the sector (formal or informal) in which they are produced. 
Households and the government demand consumer goods and f irms demand 
intermediate and capital goods. We assume that prior to making their consumption 
decisions, each household category and the government decide on the proportions of 
their income to save. The ensuing net income together with prices determines the amount 
of consumer goods demanded by each category. 
Consumption goods are Armington aggregates of imported and domestically produced 
tradeable goods. A consumer chooses the combination of goods so as to minimize total 
expenditure necessary to achieve a stated level of utility. A composite of each tradeable 
commodity is made as a CES function of domestic and foreign produced goods so that 
demand for either imports or domestically produced goods is a derived demand arising 
from a cost minimization. In this case, the optimal point is characterized by the equality 
of the ratio of imports to domestically produced goods and the price ratios. The magnitude 
of substitution elasticity determines the responsiveness of domestic demand to changes 
in the relative prices of imported goods brought about by trade and exchange rate policy. 
The structure of an imported good depends on its origin. At each level, a CES 
Armington aggregation scheme is used. Total imports are a two-step process. At the first 
level, the importer chooses between a first group comprising goods from either the CFAZ 
or Nigeria and a second group of goods imported from the rest of the world. The second 
level assumes the imported good is made up of a basket either from Nigeria or other 
CFAZ countries or from the rest of the world. 
Finally, the basket of Nigerian or CFAZ countries' products is also a CES aggregate. 
Exports are also considered at two levels. Initially, total export is the sum of export to the 
CFAZ countries versus the rest of the world, with this last component considered at the 
second level as the combination of exports to Nigeria and the rest of the world. At each 
step, a constant elasticity of transformation function is postulated with its associated 
transformation elasticity. These processes allow the choice of a commodity used by the 
consumer or produced by the producer to depend upon the substitution elasticity that 
varies with the origin and destination in the case of exports. 
Price formation in the model is standard, except that import prices are adjusted to 
take into account tax evasion and smuggling. In the equilibrium block, the model is 
closed by appropriate normalization. We fixed the exchange rate and allowed the external 
imbalance to adjust to equilibrium. The equilibrium on the product market is such that 
the supply of composite commodities equals their demand. Equilibrium in the factor 
markets is obtained by the equality of the labour supply with the sum of the demand for 
labour by both informal and formal sectors and unemployment. Equilibrium on the foreign 
market establishes a relationship between the exchange rate and the current account. 
Summaries of these blocks ( Table A1), as well as the complete specification of the 
model—which comprises 394 equations with 394 endogenous variables (Table A2)— 
are given in the Appendix. The Appendix also includes the complete list of variables and 
parameters of the model (Table A3). 
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Specific features of the model 
Our model is not the first CGE model of Cameroon,10 but it has three particular features. 
First, we use a SAM based on an input-output matrix that is more representative of 
actual economic conditions. Second, we introduce distributional considerations based 
on a household classification that takes into account preference variations. Finally, we 
explicitly introduce market segmentation into formal and informal sectors. 
There is substantial unrecorded or under-recorded trading across the Nigeria-
Cameroon border. Reasons for such trading include CFA franc (CFAF) convertibility, a 
diversified production structure in Nigeria and the CFAF/naira exchange rate. Even 
though goods from Nigeria are not of better quality, their prices are usually low enough 
to make them attractive to Cameroonian households, especially since the onset of the 
current depression. 
Prices of imports from Nigeria are determined by several factors: sales prices in Nigeria, 
transport costs, Nigerian export taxes, Cameroonian import duties, enforcement of 
legislation on irregularly imported goods into Cameroon and demand pressure. Although 
no quantitative assessment is available, most goods are believed to be imported duty free 
or at a token rate, with the difference between the regular rate and that paid being a rent 
that is shared by the customs and law enforcement officials. To allow for illegal trade or 
border penetration, a smuggling rate is used on the import side of each of the foreign 
trade zones; this is obtained by allowing different foreign trade tax rates. 
To take into account the dualism of formal and informal sector activity, the primary 
factors (labour and capital) are distinguished in the model into formal and informal. We 
assume that these factors are sector specific" and sectoral production (XS) is differentiated 
between formal and informal. However, at the distribution stage, formal and informal 
sector production is combined to give a composite good. 
Labour is mobile in the model; the wage rate in the formal sector is fixed while it is 
market determined in the informal subsectors. In the formal sector, there is minimum 
wage legislation that constrains firms to pay higher wages than desired. Some firms 
avoid this legislation by operating in the informal sector, where—in addition to not paying 
the minimum wage—they do not pay taxes. Operation in the informal sector is costly, 
however. Whether firms operate in the formal or the informal sector is a reflection of 
technology and other characteristics. Although lower wages and zero tax are paid by 
firms in the informal sector, there are additional costs that they bear to avoid being caught 
by the tax administration.12 
Workers in the formal sector earn an exogenously determined wage, w, while those in 
the informal sector earn a smaller rate, wi, determined by market and technological 
conditions. The workers who get a job in the formal sector get a rent. Accordingly, a 
worker has options for informal or formal sector. But the latter option requires waiting 
until a job is available. The model thus contains two types of labour, formal and informal. 
Formal and informal labour is used exclusively in either the formal or the informal sectors. 
We assume that firms in the formal sector are constrained by wage determination as 
stipulated by the government. We allow for unemployment with an unemployment rate 
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determined by the wedge between labour supply and total sectoral demand relative to 
total labour supply.13 
Incorporation of informal sector activities also relies on its treatment in the input-
output matrix. The sample of firms on which the aggregates were determined was made 
in 1977/78, but only those operating in the formal sectors had been followed. For 1989/ 
90, an estimation of the contribution of the informal sector was made for each sectoral 
classification based on data from the ministries of agriculture and livestock, and the 
1983/84 household survey; they were also supplemented by sporadic field data. Overall, 
the informal sector represents 43.11% of total GDP, a contribution that varies across 
sectors.14 In order to be able to observe the effects of the reform on resource allocations, 
a welfare variation model is added to the CGE model; it is based on compensating variation 
(CV) and equivalent variation (EV). 
5. Simulations and results 
An economy always experiences a complex combination of phenomena, so that it is hard 
to single out the impact of a given policy from the impact that can be attributed to these 
phenomena. Simulation of policy initiative in CGE gives an ideal way of analysing the 
effect of a policy that other analytical tools do not permit. A trade liberalization policy 
can alter the real exchange rate and the incentive structure in favour of tradeables. The 
resource allocation leads to gains and losses that may require some accompanying 
measures to deter opposition by losers or to minimize the negative impacts. The process 
by which the impact is transmitted to the relative price and the effect on the income of 
various social groups is uncertain and should be thoroughly assessed. The result of the 
simulations indicates those sectors that contract and those that expand under different 
policy scenarios and the net effect on the overall economy. Endogenous trade policy is 
another available substitution for currency devaluation via the structure of protection. 
Our analysis of tariff reform in Cameroon is based on two groups of simulations at 
two levels of disaggregation, of which one considers a single foreign market and the 
other distinguishes among three market destinations: CFAZ, Nigeria (NIG) and the rest 
of the world (ROW). The first group of simulations is based on a model without specific 
consideration of the trade zone, while the second is made of those where producers or 
consumers consider that the export market comprises the CFA zone, Nigeria and the rest 
of the world. Within each group we consider the application of a uniform export subsidy 
and a uniform import tariff together and a policy by which import tariff is increased and 
export tax is reduced at the same rate. 
According to the 1994 reform, import tariffs on all exports are harmonized around an 
average of 18.7% and agricultural and other raw material exports are taxed to satisfy the 
government deficit constraint. In each case we focus on the variation of key endogenous 
variables with respect to the base year; this is characterized by four facts: 
1. We normalize all prices net of taxes to unity; this includes the wage rate in the formal 
sector. The wage rate in the informal sector is 40% lower than that in the formal 
sector but is endogenous in all simulations. 
2. Informal sector activities demand 72% of labour, but yield only 43.48% of total 
value added and 39.87% of production at factor cost. 
3. The informal and formal households share approximately 50% of total consumption. 
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4. There are both trade and current account deficits representing, respectively, 4.6% 
and 10.5% of total GDP. 
Presentation of simulations 
Five simulations are realized under two alternative foreign market considerations (one 
and three). The first two simulations focus on direct fiscal measures that have been 
undertaken by the government. Simulation 1 (Sim 1) reproduces the proposed UDEAC 
regional fiscal reform, which consisted of the harmonization of import tariff at the level 
of 18.7%. This implies an increase by 23% of the average rate used in the SAM.15 
Simulation 2 (Sim 2) extends the tax harmonization to the export sector. This combines 
simulation 1 with uniform taxation of agricultural exports at 5%, which is the average 
tax rate on those exports at the base year. Taxation of agricultural and other raw material 
exports was required to meet the budgetary constraint in the 1995/96 financial law. The 
other policy simulations consider alternative fiscal measures that were not undertaken in 
the 1995/96 fiscal year. Simulation 3 (Sim 3) is the same as simulation 1 with subsidy of 
all exports at 5%; simulation 4 (Sim 4) is a unilateral import liberalization, which involves 
cancellation of all taxes on imports. 
Another alternative to devaluation is a uniform tariff-cum-subsidy (UTCS), by which 
a constant ad valorem tariff is applied to all imports and an equal subsidy to all export. A 
UTCS can lead to undesirable results such as the under-invoicing of imports and over-
invoicing of exports. Although the over-invoicing is less likely than under-invoicing, the 
government needs to have sufficient resources to pay the export subsidy. Such an 
asymmetry has welfare as well as resource allocation impact. In a competitive environment 
UTCS is equivalent to a devaluation of the commercial rate in a dual exchange rate 
system. However, by inducing a differential between the domestic and foreign prices of 
traded goods, a UTCS may facilitate the emergence of illegal trading activities and hence 
lead to asymmetric policy effects on imports and exports (O'Connell, 1992). By this 
asymmetry the import price is less than the full tariff-inclusive price and the export price 
is higher than the subsidy-inclusive price. Accordingly, the domestic price of exports in 
terms of imports rises as a result of an increase in the UTCS rate and invoicing fraud 
therefore leads to a real equilibrium different from what is expected from the policy. 
Illegal trade thus significantly weakens the case for uniform trade taxes as proxies for 
devaluation, but the net effect is uncertain. Our CGE is therefore useful to that effect. 
Simulation 5 (Sim 5) considers a uniform tariff-cum-subsidy (UTCS) at 5%. 
Analysis of simulation results 
Our analysis focuses on the macroeconomic impact and the welfare implications of three 
simulations (see Table A4). To differentiate the trade regime two versions of the model 
are considered: the case of one foreign market and the case in which we distinguish 
among trade with Nigeria, the CFAZ and the rest of the world. 
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Assuming one foreign market, the GDP at factor cost increases by 0.89% when the 
uniform 18.7% rate (Sim 1) is used. Such an increase is due to the large increase in 
formal sector activities (2.03%), which outweigh the 0.6% fall in informal sector 
production. The overall economic activity leads to an increase in employment that in 
turns leads to a fall of 6.10% in the unemployment rate. The budget deficit also falls (by 
5.9%) as a result of an increase in customs receipts, but the trade balance deteriorates by 
2.69%. The combined effect is positive on informal rural and formal households' welfare, 
which increases by, respectively, CFAF 0.18 billion and 14.83 billion; informal urban 
households lose CFAF 1.28 billion. 
Import prices increase as a result of a shift away from imports in favour of locally 
produced goods. The increase in the demand for locally produced goods leads to an 
increase in their prices with beneficial impacts on producer prices and factor rewards. 
Labour therefore becomes relatively more scarce and hence more expensive in the formal 
compared with the informal sector. This leads to increased employment in the informal 
sector. The increase in formal sector activities is higher than the fall in the informal 
sector, however, which explains the fall in unemployment. On the foreign market, the 
informal sector contributes more to total exports; this explains why the fall in value 
added combined with the deterioration in the relative price of local production leads to a 
more than proportional fall of exports relative to imports and hence the deterioration of 
the trade balance. 
These effects on production are reinforced in the second simulation experiment (Sim 
2) . GDP at factor costs increases more (2.42%, compared with 0.89%) and employment 
increases even more as the unemployment rate falls by 25.65%. These positive effects 
on production lead to an increase in household welfare of CFAF 9.27, 2.07 and 15.49 
billion for informal rural households, informal urban households and formal households, 
respectively. In this simulation, informal household welfare increases relatively more. 
At the macroeconomic level the budget deficit falls by 11.33%. Because of the combined 
price effects due to increases in exports and the income effect arising from the import 
side, the deterioration in the trade balance is higher (10.91%). 
According to simulation 3 (Sim 3), most of the effects on the production side remain. 
The distinction is on the macroeconomic scene, where the impacts on the deficits are 
different. The budget deficit deteriorates by 7.51% and the trade balance improves by 
9.28%. 
The overall impact of simulation 4 (Sim 4) on the budget deficit and the trade balance 
is negative. They deteriorate by 27.72% and 20.15%, respectively. The effect on the 
formal sector is positive (1.04%), unlike the impact on the informal sector (-0.72%), but 
the net effect on production is an increase of 0.28; as a result, the impact on employment 
is smaller than in the previous simulation. The impact is positive on households, especially 
the rural informal ones, as a result of the positive price effect. 
The last simulation (Sim 5) based on a single foreign market assesses the impact of a 
uniform tariff-cum-subsidy scheme. Overall GDP at factor cost increases by 1.67% as in 
the third simulation and employment increases but at a higher rate than in the third 
simulation. As a result, the unemployment rate falls by 16.12% and household welfare 
increases. Except for the formal household category, for which welfare increases by 
16.56 rather than 21.39 as in Sim 3, all households are better off in this simulation. 
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A central issue in this research is whether the policy impact changes when we consider 
alternative trade regimes. The simulations are therefore reproduced in a model where 
three, rather than one, foreign markets are considered. As expected, some of the results 
are significantly modified. 
When we incorporate these alternatives into Sim 1, there is almost no change in 
either sectoral production or total GDP at factor cost; as a result, the level of employment 
and welfare do not change. Instead, other macroeconomic aggregates change substantially. 
The budget deficit falls by 36.16%, while the fall was only 5.91% in the original Sim 1. 
The trade balance deteriorates by 4.14% rather than 2.69%. The impact differs according 
to the region. The initial surplus with the CFAZ deteriorates by 48.56%; the deficit with 
Nigeria deteriorates by 30.38%, but improves by 18.27% with the rest of the world. 
Unlike the direct substitution of imports by locally produced goods that was observed 
with one foreign market, when three market destinations and origin are distinguished, 
there is a first substitution between goods imported from each of the three foreign markets. 
Such an effect, due to relative price changes, is more pronounced for food and rent 
agricultural products that are cheaper in the CFAZ, causing an increase in imports from 
CFAZ compared with the other two foreign markets. For the other tradeable goods category 
(TS), they become cheaper when imported from the CFAZ or Nigeria compared with the 
ROW. As a result of these shifts in relative profitability, the trade balance with the three 
zones differs. Only a limited substitution is observed between imports and domestic 
production. However, such a limited demand can induce a producer price increase, leading 
to a boost of factor rewards that cause a higher demand for capital in formal sector 
activities and a lower labour demand in the informal sector. 
Different patterns are obtained for the second simulation with differentiated trade 
regimes. The formal sector's production falls by 0.01% and there is an increase of 0.72% 
in the informal sector's. In this case also the budget deficit improves while the trade 
balance deteriorates. 
With respect to unilateral liberalization, there is substantial increase in economic 
activity: GDP increases by 7.33% compared with the 0.28% obtained with one foreign 
market. This result can be attributed to a large increase in informal sectors (16.32%). 
While trade liberalization had almost no impact on the labour market with one foreign 
market, allowing different market destination leads to a 93.17% fall in the unemployment 
rate and an increase in household welfare. At the macroeconomic level, the budget deficit 
deterioates less and the trade balance improves. 
Such impacts can be traced to the relative price effects. Import prices of food and 
agricultural and industrial goods fall in the ROW relative to the two African regions. As 
a result, imports from the ROW increase. The overall decline in import price leads to an 
increase in consumer surplus of locally produced goods—but the increase in their demand 
does not lead to an increase in their prices, partly because of substitution with imports. 
The increase in supply to satisfy this additional demand comes at the disadvantage of 
factor remuneration. The higher pressure on the labour market leads to higher demand 
for labour. For the last simulation, paired comparisons show that in the scenario of one 
foreign market, GDP grows less (1.67 and 5.24%), the unemployment rate falls more 
(-6.9 and -16.1) and welfare improves relative to the base year for all household categories 
when we account for trade regime differentiation. 
6. Conclusion and policy implications 
The overall objective of this study was to assess trade and exchange rate policy options 
for Cameroon, in light of recent economic developments. Possible options include a 
status quo situation with adjustment entirely depending on use of internal adjustment 
mechanisms. A second option is the allowance for more flexibility in some policy arenas 
such as fiscal policy rules and currency convertibility, while a third possibility is to 
allow for differentiation in the exchange regime. 
Our assessment based on field data and simulations from the CGE suggests that the 
following elements are important in policy discussions in both UDEAC and the CFAZ: 
There is asymmetric impact on export and import sides as well as differentiated impacts 
on trade tax and exchange rate variation with trade partners. Particular attention should 
be devoted to cross-border trade with Nigeria. The higher impact is obtained on 
macroeconomic aggregates and employment when we differentiate the foreign market 
by market destination of exports and origin of imports. 
As a result of these facts, trade and exchange rate policies should be coordinated with 
both Nigeria and other ECOWAS members. Trade liberalization yields the highest increase 
in GDP and employment when we take explicit account of market destination and origin. 
This result suggests that abolition of illegal trade will lead to more economic growth and 
higher welfare. Another policy recommendation, also supplemented with field data on 
cross-border trade, highlights the fact that the CFAF is demanded because of its 
convertibility. The evolution of bilateral exchange rates with neighbouring non-CFA 
countries not only reflects relative competitiveness; the lack of policy coordination 
penalizes Cameroon and there is no indication that Nigeria gains from it. 
Notes 
1. Also see Collier and Joshi (1990), Aghevli and Montiel (1991), and Williamson 
(1991). 
2. Dordunoo and Njinkeu (1996) analyse the contribution of exchange rate regimes 
to growth and inflation in SSA. 
3. See Decaluwe et al. (1999) for the analysis of the regional tax reform and its 
relationship with regional integration. 
4. In his poverty profile study, Njinkeu (1994) took into consideration differences in 
preferences, suggesting that stratification of regional and household characteristics 
is necessary if the policy aim is to secure economic growth and protect the poor. 
The regional characterization follows agro-ecological zones and is related to both 
economic activity and consumption preferences. 
5. Most of the transfer programme of our economy is exogenous to the model, except 
the assistance of working households to the unemployed. 
6. We have differentiated among three trade regimes: the African Franc Zone (AFZ), 
Nigeria and the rest of the world. AFZ comprises countries with production 
structures comparable to that of Cameroon who are members of the currency union; 
the rest of the world is made up of developed countries with exchange rates 
exogenously given to Cameroon. Trade with these two regions is standard; trade 
with Nigeria is analysed using cross-border trade data. 
7. See Decaluwe et al. (1987) for more developments on the closure rules. 
8. Adelman and Robinson (1988), analysing the impact of the closure rule, concluded 
that while the functional distribution of income depends on the closure, the size of 
the distribution of income is not affected. They also found that the treatment of 
balance of payments is important for distributional impact of adjustment to shocks. 
9. All formal labour salary is received by formal households only and informal labour 
salary is distributed only among informal households. 
10. Models based on the pre-1989 input-output tables include Benjamin and Devarajan 
(1985), Benjamin et al. (1989), Dahl et al. (1986), Benjamin and Yoon (1991), 
Devarajan and de Melo (1987). 
11. No policy can lead formal labour to becoming informal and nobody operates in 
both formal and informal sectors. Labour mobility is limited to the sector (informal 
sector labour cannot move to the formal sector). 
12. Fortin et al. (1994) show that it is possible to find a firm that would demand the 
same amount of labour regardless of the sector where it operates. Such a firm 
earns higher profits in the informal sector. If the profit tax rate falls, there is a 
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level at which the profit in the formal sector increases at a faster rate than that in 
the informal sector. 
13. The labour market is closed by keeping nominal wage in the formal sector and 
real wage in the informal sectors fixed at their base year level. 
14. We have, for example, 20.4% in the primary sector, 1.045% in extractive industries, 
2.75% in manufacturing, 3.54% in transport and telecommunication, and 4.2% in 
banking and insurance. See Tchuinou and Nguenevit (1993) for a complete 
description of the process by which the informal sector is taken care of in each 
sector of the input-output matrix. 
15. Such an increase does not contradict current trends suggested by the World Trade 
Organization (WTO), as the pre-reform legal rate is an average 35% (see Njinkeu 
and Nana, 1994, for more developments). 
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Appendix - Model specifications 
Table A1: Main blocks of the 1989/90 Cameroon SAM for trade policy option for the CFA 
countries analysis (in bil l ion CFA francs) 
A1a: Supply block 
FFA IFA FRA IRA OILS EIND FAIN IAIN FTS ITS NTSS Total 
FL 2.7 14.1 18.5 37.4 113.9 227.5 362.6 776.7 
IL 532.8 148.7 121.0 395.8 1198.3 
FK 2.3 33.1 261.7 60.2 263.2 461.0 132.1 1213.6 
IK 43.8 12.5 14.2 262.1 332.6 
VA 5.0 576.6 47.2 161.2 280.2 97.6 377.1 135.2 688.5 657.9 494.7 3521.2 
AFO 2.2 16.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.6 3.8 3.9 4.4 13.6 8.0 52.8 
TAG 0.0 0.2 0.5 0.0 0.0 14.8 19.7 13.8 0.0 32.6 0.1 81.7 
OIL 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 62.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 62.5 
EIP 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.5 32.5 17.4 29.9 5.9 13.7 2.2 102.3 
AIP 2.7 19.5 14.1 24.6 8.4 67.8 161.0 33.5 113.3 185.6 43.6 674.1 
TS 1.3 4.8 31.5 2.0 43.9 33.2 73.0 8.5 215.1 70.9 48.4 532.6 
NTS 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
IC 6.2 40.8 46.3 26.6 52.8 148.9 337.4 89.6 338.7 316.4 102.3 1506.0 
XS 11.2 617.4 93.5 187.8 333.0 246.5 714.5 224.8 1027.2 974.3 597.0 5027.2 
Notes: 
FFA: formal food agriculture; IFA: informal food agriculture; OILS: oil sector; FL: formal labour; IL: 
informal labour; FRA: formal rent agriculture; IRA: informal rent agriculture; IK: informal capital; 
EIND: export-oriented industry; FAIN: other formal industries sector; VA: value added; FK: formal 
capital; IAIN: other informal industries sector; FTS: formal service sector; NTSS: public service 
sector; ITS informal service sector; AFO: agricultural food product; TAG: perennial agriculture 
product; OIL: oil; EIP: export-oriented industrial product; AIP: other industrial product; TS: tradeable 
services; NTS: non-tradeable services; IC: total sector's intermediate consumption; XS: sectoral 
production. 
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A1b: Demand block 
AFO TAG OIL EIP AIP TS NTS Total 
FFA 11.2 11.2 
I FA 617.4 617.4 
FRA 93.5 93.5 
IRA 187.8 187.8 
OILS 333.0 333.0 
EIND 246.5 246.5 
FAIN 714.5 714.5 
IAIN 224.8 224.8 
FTS 1027.2 1027.2 
ITS 974.3 974.3 
NTSS 597.0 597.0 
XP 628.6 281.3 333.0 246.5 939.3 2001.5 597.0 5027.2 
D 607.3 177.1 75.0 117.7 896.0 1880.6 597.0 4350.7 
EXC 2.1 109.5 36.2 36.3 184.1 
EXN 17.1 19.3 7.1 12.1 55.6 
EXR 2.1 104.2 258.0 72.5 436.8 
Notes: 
D: domestic sales; EXC: total exports to the CFAF zone; EXN: total exports to Nigeria; 
EXR: total exports to the rest of the world (ROW); XP: supply of domestic goods 
A1c: Absorption block 
AFO TAG OIL EIP AIP TS NTS Total 
D 607.3 177.1 
IDT 0.5 3.8 
MC 10.0 4.1 
TCM 1.6 0.7 
MN 8.0 2.1 
TNM 1.2 0.3 
MR 2.0 0.7 
TRM 0.3 0.1 
Q 630.9 188.9 
C 726.3 149.6 
GC 
INTD 52.8 81.7 
INV -148.2 -42.4 
75.0 
-3.2 
71.8 
0.0 
62.5 
9.3 
117.7 896.0 1880.6 597.0 4350.7 
7.5 63.5 71.2 0.4 143.7 
74.4 3.3 91.8 
0.0 0.0 2.3 
62.9 63.0 37.2 173.2 
7.4 11.6 0.0 20.5 
146.7 188.9 260.5 7.8 606.6 
17.4 34.7 0.0 0.0 52.5 
359.6 1257.7 2323.9 608.5 5441.3 
111.5 804.4 983.0 2774.8 
608.5 608.5 
102.3 674.1 532.6 0.0 1506.0 
145.8 -220.8 808.3 0.0 552.0 
Notes: 
IDT: indirect taxes; MC total imports from the CFAF zone; MN: total imports from Nigeria; MR: total 
imports from the ROW; TCM: taxes on imports from the CFAF zone; TNM: taxes on imports from 
Nigeria; TRM: taxes on imports from the ROW; C: final consumption; GC: public expenditures; Q: 
composite goods and services; INTD: intermediate demand for goods; INV: investment goods 
(volume). 
TRADE AND EXCHANGE RATE POLICY OPTIONS FOR THE C F A COUNTRIES: 
A i d : Income distribution block 
2 7 
IRH IUH FH UH F G CFAZ NIG ROW Total 
FL 776.7 776.7 
IL 869.6 326.5 2.2 1198.3 
FK 94.3 60.8 583.8 474.7 1213.6 
IK 42.5 27.4 262.7 332.6 
IRH 98.5 21.2 2.0 5.9 2.0 129.6 
IUH 20.3 9.0 29.3 
FH 243.5 54.7 4.0 4.2 31.3 337.7 
UH 0.0 
F 5.9 23.6 234.0 76.6 340.1 
G 35.3 20.1 23.6 12.5 96.1 187.6 
CFAZ 0.0 
NIG 0.0 
ROW 4.9 4.9 
M 221.0 91.8 173.2 606.6 871.6 
TITR 221.0 
Rev 1041.7 440.7 1670.4 362.3 487.2 544.8 100.0 183.3 812.6 5643.0 
C 828.4 373.7 1210.4 362.3 608.5 3383.3 
EX 184.6 55.7 438.2 678.5 
TRF 129.6 29.3 337.7 0.0 340.1 187.6 4.9 1029.2 
SAV 83.7 37.7 122.3 0.0 147.1 -251.3 -84.6 127.6 369.5 552.0 
Notes: 
IRH: informal rural households; IUH: informal urban households; FH: formal households; 
UH: unemployed household; CFAZ: CFAF zone; NIG: Nigeria; ROW: Rest of the world; 
F: firms; G: government; M: imports; Rev: total revenue ; EX: total exports; TRF: transfers; 
SAV: savings; TITR: total indirect tax revenue. 
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(13) HDIVh = drh.(FR-TAXFP1 -FTR) 
3 
(14) FR = ( 1 - £ A" + Pindex.GTF ^ 
h 
(15) TKR = ^(PVAt.VA; - wi.Lf) + ^ (PVAf.VAf - w.£?) 1 
i I 
(16) = PVAl. VAi -w.Lf 4 
(17) RKf = PVAf.UAf-w.L°f 7 
(18) UR = ^jXJh.HDRh 1 
h 
(19) HDRh = HRh.(1 -hth)~(HTRh + HTCh + HTNh + LSTh) 3 
(20) GR = ^ hth ,HRh + TAXFPI + £ IDT + TAXM + TAXE + e.RTG 1 
a j 
(21) I D T j ^ t d j . P D j . D j 7 
(22) TAXM = X 7 T A / , + X + I ™ M m 1 
a b m 
(23) TCMa=itca.P™.MCa 4 
(24) TNMh=itnh.e.PbWM.MNh 5 
(25) TRM = itr.e.P™ .MRm 6 * 7 /n m m m 
(26) TAXE = ^TCEc+^TNEc+^TREd 1 
c c d 
(27) r C £ c = ( e f c f J f £ . £ X C c ) / ( l + e f c c ) 4 
(28) 77V£r = (etnc. e. P™E. EXNC) / (1 + ) 4 
(29) 7 7 ? £ d = (etrd.e.PdWE.EXRd)/(l + etrd) 4 
(30) TAXFPI = r/>z/.(i - 2 A * 1 
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